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The Supreme Court of New South Wales has recently clarified that certain pet care tasks may be eligible for statutory benefits under the Motor Accidents Injuries Act 2017 (NSW) (MAIA Act). In the case of Insurance Australia Limited NRMA Insurance v Chowdhury [2025] NSWSC 1392 the Court found that routine care of domestic pets, including feeding, watering, and changing litter, can qualify as domestic services and therefore fall under compensable attendant care services. This decision broadens the scope of reimbursable treatment and care expenses and has important implications for insurers, claims managers, and claimants.

The Court’s reasoning demonstrates a clear preference for interpreting the statutory language according to its ordinary meaning rather than relying on prior legislative schemes or common law restrictions. The decision signals a more expansive approach to determining what types of assistance and care expenses may be eligible for reimbursement under the 2017 statutory benefits scheme.

Background

Mr Chowdhury was injured in a motor vehicle accident on 11 November 2024. He sustained a fractured right ankle and an injury to his left wrist. Hospitalisation lasted approximately five weeks. Following his discharge, he was temporarily unable to perform certain weight-bearing tasks.

As part of his claim for statutory benefits, Mr Chowdhury sought reimbursement for services related to the care of his three cats. These services included feeding, providing water, and changing the litter. NRMA Insurance refused to pay for these services. The refusal was upheld on internal review.

The matter was initially referred to the Personal Injury Commission (PIC) as a medical assessment dispute. It ultimately progressed to a miscellaneous claims assessment to determine whether the claimed pet care services qualified as treatment and care expenses under section 1.4 of the MAI Act.

Legislative framework

Section 1.4 of the MAI Act defines “treatment and care” exhaustively. The definition is confined to the categories expressly listed in paragraphs (a)–(k), namely medical and dental treatment (including pharmaceuticals), rehabilitation, ambulance transportation, respite care, attendant care services, aids and appliances (including prostheses), education and vocational training, and home, transport, workplace and educational facility modifications.

While paragraph (l) allows for additional kinds of treatment, care, support or services, this is limited to those prescribed by regulation. Services declared by regulation to be excluded are expressly carved out.

Given the exhaustive nature of the definition, the claimant was required to establish that the claimed pet care services fell within one of the specified statutory categories.

Both parties agreed that the only potentially relevant category was attendant care services. Attendant care services include assistance with daily tasks and specifically refer to domestic services as examples. The insurer acknowledged that feeding and caring for pets could be considered daily tasks but argued that these services did not fall within the statutory meaning of domestic services.

PIC Member Cassidy considered obiter comments from Teuma & Anor v C P & P K Judd Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 166, where Basten JA observed that caring for pets, like caring for furniture, is an inherent part of the concept of domestic assistance. Applying this reasoning to Mr Chowdhury’s circumstances, the PIC determined that the claimed pet care services were compensable under the MAI Act.

Supreme Court Decision

The insurer sought judicial review, challenging whether the statutory definition of attendant care services excluded pet care. NRMA Insurance relied on prior statutory schemes and common law.

The insurer argued that gratuitous pet care is not recoverable at common law. It contended that predecessor legislation confined domestic assistance to care provided for injured persons and did not extend to pet care. The insurer further submitted that the MAI Act adopts language and reflects purposes consistent with that earlier legislative framework. Finally, it argued that the MAI Act’s emphasis on cost containment indicates that Parliament did not intend to extend coverage to pet care services.

The Court accepted that gratuitous pet care is not compensable at common law but held that this did not constrain the operation of the statutory scheme. The Court emphasised that the MAI Act provides for reimbursement of actual treatment and care expenses incurred, rather than compensation by way of damages.

The Court concluded that feeding, watering, and changing the litter of domestic cats falls within the ordinary meaning of domestic services and is therefore a compensable attendant care service. The Court emphasised that the MAI Act should be interpreted based on its own text and structure and should not be limited by prior legislation or common law analogies.

The reasoning in Chowdhury provides guidance as to how similar questions may be approached in future statutory benefits disputes under the MAI Act. The decision emphasises that issues of compensability are to be resolved by reference to the text, purpose and operation of the MAI Act itself, rather than by analogy with earlier statutory regimes or restrictive common law principles.

The Supreme Court confirmed that the MAI Act establishes a scheme for the reimbursement of reasonable and necessary treatment and care expenses actually incurred. In that context, the Court accepted that certain forms of pet care may, depending on the circumstances, fall within the concept of domestic assistance. However, the decision does not suggest that all pet-related costs are compensable, nor does it equate pet care with treatment or rehabilitation expenses.

Importantly, the scope of compensable care remains fact-specific and will depend on the claimant’s functional capacity, the nature of the services provided, and whether those services fall within the statutory definition of treatment and care. Chowdhury does not create a general entitlement to pet care expenses but clarifies that such services are not excluded as a matter of principle.

The decision is likely to have practical implications for claims management and the assessment of domestic assistance claims, requiring insurers and claimants to closely examine how claimed services relate to the injured person’s daily activities and needs. Ordinary household tasks, including care for domestic pets, may be compensable where they properly fall within the statutory framework and are reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. With no appeal to be pursued, Chowdhury now stands as authoritative guidance on the construction of the treatment and care provisions of the MAI Act, notwithstanding that its application will remain fact-specific.

This article was published on 6 February 2026 by Carroll & O’Dea Lawyers and is based on the relevant state of the law (legislation, regulations and case law) at that date for the jurisdiction in which it is published. Please note this article does not constitute legal advice. If you ever need legal advice or want to discuss a legal problem, please contact us to see if we can help. You can reach us on 1800 059 278 or via the Contact us page on our website. If you or a loved one has been injured, use our Personal Injury Claim Check now.