Publications

The recent Review Panel decision in Irani v Insurance Australia Limited t/as NRMA Insurance [2025] NSWPICMP 832 provides important clarification for claimants seeking statutory benefits under the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (MAIA). In particular, the decision confirms that costs associated with pet care, such as dog walking and washing, do not fall within the statutory definition of “treatment and care”. As a result, these expenses cannot be recovered under section 3.24 of MAIA.

Although the outcome is unfavourable for injured people who genuinely rely on pets for emotional support or day-to-day functioning, it is useful guidance on how the PIC currently interprets the legislation.

Statutory framework

Section 3.24 of MAIA permits claimants to recover expenses that meet the definition of “treatment and care”. The definition appears in section 1.4 and includes several categories of support, the most relevant being:

• “attendant care services”, which extend to personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance and domestic services, and
• “rehabilitation”, which encompasses interventions designed to maximise a person’s independence and participation in daily life.

Whether pet care fits into these categories was central to the dispute in Irani.

Background

The claimant suffered psychological injuries following a motor vehicle accident on 5 April 2022. He sought reimbursement from the insurer for the cost of walking and washing his dogs. He argued that these services formed part of his psychological treatment and therefore constituted statutory benefits under section 3.24.

A PIC Member initially accepted that emotional-support or therapy animals may fall within the concept of “rehabilitation”, opening the door to the possibility that expenses related to their care could also be recoverable.

After the matter was referred to a Medical Assessor, however, the Assessor rejected the claim. The Assessor concluded that the dogs were not therapy animals, were not trained for therapeutic purposes and therefore did not meet the legislative criteria. The claimant then successfully applied for the matter to be reviewed.

Issues before the Review Panel

The Review Panel first clarified the scope of the medical dispute. It emphasised that:

1. A medical dispute must relate to a “medical assessment matter” under the Act.
2. The insurer’s decision only concerned dog walking and dog washing.
3. The claimant’s internal review application was limited to those specific expenses.

As a result, the Panel concluded that the broader question, whether pets themselves can ever constitute “treatment or care” was not formally part of this medical dispute, although the Panel ultimately addressed this issue for completeness.

Causation: did the accident create a need for pet-care services?

The Panel reviewed the medical evidence and determined that the claimant’s psychological injury did not generate a need for assistance with walking or washing his dogs. There was evidence that he could leave the home for other reasons and that his injury did not prevent him from performing these tasks himself. As a result, even if dog-related services were theoretically capable of being treatment, the claimant’s need for such services did not arise from the accident.

Do dog-related services amount to “treatment and care”?

The Panel then addressed the nature of pet-care services more generally. It concluded that dog washing, and dog walking do not fall within the statutory definition of “treatment and care”. The reasoning included that dog walking and washing are not “rehabilitation” because they do not assist a claimant to maximise independence or participation in life.

Additionally, these services are not “attendant care services” and do not involve personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance or domestic services. Relying on Geaghan v D’Aubert [2002] NSWCA 260, the Panel noted that “domestic services” do not extend to the care of pets. Although Geaghan concerned a damages claim, it provides useful guidance on how the term should be understood in the statutory benefits context.

Are pets themselves a form of treatment or care?

Despite the formal limits of the dispute, the Panel considered whether the dogs themselves could constitute treatment or care for the purpose of section 3.24. The Panel rejected this possibility. It found that:

1. Pets are not “attendant care services” because they do not provide the kinds of support defined in the Act.
2. Pets are not “rehabilitation”, as their presence does not maximise a claimant’s independence or enable participation in daily life.
3. Pets do not fall within any other statutory category of treatment or care.

The Panel highlighted several factual considerations including that there was no evidence that the dogs performed a therapeutic function, they were not trained or certified therapy animals and that their role in the claimant’s life did not change after the accident. Ultimately, the enjoyment or companionship they provided did not elevate them into the legal category of treatment.

The Review Panel’s determination

Ultimately, the Panel concluded that:

1. Dog walking and dog washing are not “treatment and care” within section 3.24, and
2. The claimant’s psychological injuries did not cause a need for those services.

Consequently, the claimed expenses were not recoverable as statutory benefits.

Why does this decision matter for claimant’s?

The Irani decision is an important reminder that ordinary pet-care services are not recoverable as treatment or care under the MAIA. The law draws a clear distinction between trained therapy animals with a therapeutic purpose and household pets that provide comfort or companionship. Claimants must establish both firstly that an expense fits within the statutory definition of “treatment and care”, and secondly that the need for the service arises from the motor accident injury.

For claimant lawyers, the case illustrates the importance of obtaining clear medical evidence where an injured person relies heavily on pets for psychological functioning. It also underscores the difficulty of recovering expenses that fall outside the traditional categories of care recognised by the Act.

Distinguishing Irani from Forrest v QBE Insurance (Australia) Limited [2025] NSWPIC 206

The Review Panel’s reasoning in Irani can be contrasted with the PIC’s decision in Forrest v QBE Insurance (Australia) Limited [2025] NSWPIC 206, where dog walking services were accepted as compensable attendant care.

The distinction lies in both the statutory pathway and the evidence. In Irani, the claim arose in a medical dispute and turned on whether dog walking and washing constituted “treatment and care” or “rehabilitation”. The Review Panel found that the claimant’s psychological injury did not create a medical need for those services and, in any event, that ordinary pet care does not fall within the statutory definition.

By contrast, Forrest considered dog walking as a form of domestic assistance within attendant care services, rather than as treatment. The Member accepted that the claimant’s injuries affected his capacity to meet ordinary household responsibilities, including pet care, and that external assistance could therefore fall within section 1.4 of the MAIA.

Read together, the decisions confirm that pets are not themselves a form of treatment or care. However, pet-related services may be compensable where they arise from accident-related incapacity and are properly characterised as attendant care rather than medical treatment.

This article was published on 28 January 2026 by Carroll & O’Dea Lawyers and is based on the relevant state of the law (legislation, regulations and case law) at that date for the jurisdiction in which it is published. Please note this article does not constitute legal advice. If you ever need legal advice or want to discuss a legal problem, please contact us to see if we can help. You can reach us on 1800 059 278 or via the Contact us page on our website. If you or a loved one has been injured, use our Personal Injury Claim Check now.